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Preemption by Prosecution: Antitrust
Consent Decrees and their Effect on State
Law
Consent decrees are the most common method of disposing of
cases brought by the Justice Department under the Sherman Act.'
They resemble ordinary agreements to dismiss, but differ in that
they are signed by a judge and entered as orders of the court. Pur-
suant to Section 5(a) of the Tunney Act, 2 a court may approve a
consent decree only if it finds that the decree is "in the public in-
terest."' In addition, the government must publish the proposed
decree in the Federal Register at least sixty days prior to its entry,
and "must receive and consider any written comments relating to
the proposed decree."'4 Once entered, the decree gains the force of
an injunction,5 and a party who violates its terms may'be held in
' Approximately 80 percent of the antitrust complaints filed by the Justice Depart-
ment during the period between 1955 and 1972 were terminated prior to trial by entry of a
consent decree. H.R. Rep. No. 93-1463, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 6535, 6536 ("1973 House Report"); Michael E. DeBow, Judicial
Regulation of Industry: An Analysis of Antitrust Consent Decrees, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F.
353, 353.
2 The Tunney Act is the popular name for the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act
of 1974, 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h) (1982).
3 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (1982) provides:
Before entering any consent judgment proposed by the United States under this
section, the court shall determine that the entry of such judgment is in the public
interest. For the purpose of such determination, the court may consider-
(1) the competitive impact of such judgment, including termination of alleged
violations, provisions for enforcement and modification, duration of relief sought,
anticipated effects of alternative remedies actually considered, and any other con-
siderations bearing upon the adequacy of such judgment;
(2) the impact of entry of such judgment upon the public generally and indi-
viduals alleging specific injury from the violations set forth in the complaint in-
cluding consideration of the public benefit, if any, to be derived from a determina-
tion of the issues at trial.
- 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(d) (1982). Any comments received, along with the government's
responses, are to be published in the Federal Register. In addition, the Antitrust Division
must prepare a competitive impact statement that contains, among other things, a descrip-
tion of the defendant's practices which gave rise to the alleged violation, an explanation of
the proposed decree, and a description and evaluation of the alternatives to the proposal
actually considered by the Justice Department.
Because the terms of a consent decree are negotiated between the parties, such a
decree is similar to a contract in many respects. However,
[u]nlike a private agreement, a consent decree, once it has been accepted by a
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contempt.6
The limits of this framework were recently tested by Judge
Harold Greene's approval of the consent decree in United States v.
American Telephone and Telegraph Co. ("AT&T"). 7 Over the ob-
jections of several states that sought to intervene, Judge Greene
approved a decree which granted AT&T and the divested operat-
ing companies exemptions from certain state regulations.' He held
that entry of the consent decree preempted conflicting state regu-
lation of the telephone industry.9 Judge Greene based his decision
on the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution 0 and
on the Sherman Act,11 stating that a decree issued under the au-
thority of the Sherman Act renders unenforceable "state regula-
tory statutes ... to the extent that they prevent compliance with
[the decree's] terms. '1 2
Associate (now Chief) Justice Rehnquist dissented from the
Supreme Court's summary affirmance of the decree. He was con-
cerned that a consent decree was an insufficient predicate for invo-
cation of the Supremacy Clause: "I am troubled by the notion that
a district court, by entering what is in essence a private agreement
between parties to a lawsuit, invokes the Supremacy Clause powers
of the Federal Government to pre-empt state regulatory laws."1 3
This comment addresses the tension between Chief Justice
Rehnquist's position and that of Judge Greene. First, it discusses
court, has the same effect as a judgment in a fully litigated decree. After entry, the
legal effect of an antitrust consent decree on the rights of the parties, including
the rights of the government, are adjudicatory rather than contractual in nature.
Report of the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, Consent
Decree Program of the Dep't of Justice, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1959) ("1959 House Re-
port"). See also United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681-82 (1971).
8 See, for example, EEOC v. Liberty Trucking Co., 695 F.2d. 1038, 1043 (7th Cir. 1982).
7 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982).
Id. at 225.
9 Id. at 160.
10 U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
11 Sherman Antitrust Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
12 AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 155 (footnote omitted).
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001, 1002 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting
from summary affirmance). Rehnquist also questioned whether a Tunney Act hearing itself
is constitutional, as it can occur only after the parties have achieved a settlement. If the
dispute is at an end, he argued, there is no longer a "case or controversy" for the purpose of
Article III jurisdiction. Id. at 1003.
This argument is easily answered. A prerequisite to the settlement of the dispute is the
existence of the consent decree. But for the existence of a consent decree, the dispute would
continue. Perhaps it would settle at another time on different terms without a decree, but
this does not undercut the basic point that until the judge agrees to enter the decree, the
case is not settled-the dispute has not gone away.
PREEMPTION BY PROSECUTION
the problem raised by the AT&T consent decree. Second, it ex-
plores possible sources of authority for finding that an antitrust
consent decree may preempt state law, including those relied upon
by Judge Greene. Finally, it proposes a framework for determining
when such a consent decree may in fact preempt state law.
I. PRIVATE CONSENT AS FEDERAL LAW
A. AT&T The Question Raised
The AT&T consent decree required AT&T to "take various
actions for which regulatory approval [was] required under state
law," such as the transfer of assets, and it "restrict[ed] the Operat-
ing Companies with respect to activities which they [were] author-
ized to engage in under state regulation," such as long distance
telecommunications." Twenty-four states contended that the fed-
eral district court "lack[ed] the power to enter the decree proposed
by the parties without the approval of the regulatory commissions
acting under state law.' 1 5 In response, the Justice Department and
AT&T argued that the decree would preempt state laws to the ex-
tent that they conflicted with the decree, and that state consent
was therefore unnecessary. 6
Judge Greene recognized that requiring such consent would ef-
fectively block entry of the decree. In addition, he was concerned
that continued state regulation of the telephone industry might re-
sult in a "'balkanized scheme of telecommunications service' "1
that could impede industry competition. "If the States' claims are
valid," he stated, "the Court and the parties might have to search
for different means to implement the mandate of the Sherman
Act.""8 But in dealing with these concerns he may have ignored
valid claims by the states.
Judge Greene dealt with the claims of the states by declaring
that the decree preempted state law and that their consent was
therefore unnecessary. He proposed two justifications for this ra-
tionale. First, he argued that since the decree was an order issued
pursuant to federal law and approved by a court, it was federal law
for purposes of preemption. 19 As he saw it, "a consent decree has
the same effect as a decree issued after a finding of liability on the
" AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 153-54 (footnote omitted).
" Id. at 153.
16 Id. at 154.
17 Id. at 154 n.100 (citation omitted).
18 Id.
19 Id. at 155 n.102.
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merits."2 Thus, Judge Greene equated consent decrees with judi-
cial acts; and since judicial acts can supercede state law,21 he con-
cluded that consent decrees have the same preemptive effect. Al-
ternatively, he stated that the Tunney Act hearing and his finding
that the decree was in the public interest were sufficient to allow
preemption of state law under the Sherman Act and the
Supremacy Clause.22
II. THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE: WHAT IS FEDERAL LAW?
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution
provides:
This Constitution and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof.., shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 3
This is the textual basis for the principle that federal law may
preempt conflicting state law. The question raised by the AT&T
decree is whether an antitrust consent decree should be considered
federal "law" for the purpose of preempting state law. Certain
things are "law" without question. The Constitution, statutes
passed by Congress pursuant to an enumerated power, and judicial
decisions interpreting statutes are all "law" for the purposes of the
Supremacy Clause. A consent decree, however, fits within none of
these categories. Even though a decree is entered by a court, and
thus has a judicial component, it also has a private, contractual
component.2 4 By equating consent decrees with judicial acts, Judge
Greene essentially ignored this contractual component.
The remainder of this comment will address three related ra-
tionales for asserting that consent decrees do rise to the level of
federal law. First, an antitrust consent decree may be law simply
20 Id.
21 See, for example, North Carolina Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971);
Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
22 AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 160.
23 U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
24 Douglas Laycock, Consent Decrees Without Consent: The Rights of Nonconsenting
Third Parties, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 103. See also Local Number 93 v. City of Cleveland, 106
S. Ct. 3063, 3074 (1986), citing United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223,
235-37, and n.10 (1975): "More accurately, then, as we have previously recognized, consent
decrees 'have attributes both of contracts and of judicial decrees,' a dual character that has
resulted in different treatment for different purposes."
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because Congress intended to give such contracts the power to pre-
empt state law; second, the judicial approval and hearing proce-
dure mandated by the Tunney Act may render a decree issued
pursuant to that procedure federal law (this was an alternative ra-
tionale offered by Judge Greene); or finally, an antitrust decree
might constitute federal law because it is coterminous with the
Sherman Act, which is federal law, in that it imposes no additional
requirements on the parties.2 5
Each of these rationales is facially plausible, but this comment
will demonstrate that only the last is consistent with the
Supremacy Clause and with the legislative history of the Sherman
Act.
III. POSSIBLE SOURCES OF AUTHORITY FOR THE PREEMPTION OF
STATE LAW
There are two possible sources for a conclusion that Congress
intended antitrust consent decrees to have preemptive force. The
first source is the body of judicial decisions regarding the preemp-
tive force of the Sherman Act itself. The second source is the Tun-
ney Act, which defines judicial procedures for approval of antitrust
consent decrees. Neither demonstrates the legislative intent neces-
sary to support Judge Greene's conclusions.
A. Preemption of State Law by the Sherman Act
Federal law preempts state law in two circumstances. First, if
the federal law "occupies the field"-in other words, if Congress
has determined that the federal government's interest in a particu-
lar area of law requires that it override all state law in that
area-then the federal law preempts the state law regardless of
whether the two provisions actually conflict.26 Second, if the fed-
eral law does not occupy the field, it may nevertheless preempt
state law if there is a direct conflict between the two.
The preemptive effect of the Sherman Act is limited. First, the
Sherman Act does not occupy the field 2 7 As a result, state regula-
25 See Local Number 93, 106 S. Ct. at 3077 where the Supreme Court held that a court
may approve a consent decree that gives broader relief than a court could have awarded
after trial.
28 See, for example, Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961) (tobacco regulation);
Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956) (sedition); Automobile Workers v. O'Brien, 339
U.S. 454 (1950) (labor relations); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (alien registra-
tion); Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Porter, 273 U.S. 341 (1927) (railroad regulation).
27 See Itco Corp. v. Michelin Tire Corp., Com. Div., 722 F.2d 42, 48 n.9 (4th Cir. 1983),
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tion of commerce is preempted by the Act only when it "conflict[s]
or interfere[s]" with the objectives of the Sherman Act.2 8 Second,
even when there is a conflict, individual conduct which would oth-
erwise violate the Sherman Act has been held exempt from the Act
when it is found to constitute "state action. 2 9 An examination of
the history of the Sherman Act and of the development of the
"state action" exemption demonstrates that Congress intended to
give a great deal of deference to state regulation of commerce, even
when that regulation seems to conflict with the Act.
1. The Legislative History of the Sherman Act and the
Commerce Clause. The Sherman Act prohibits only contracts or
conspiracies in restraint of interstate commerce.30 The drafters of
the Act thereby linked its reach to the scope of congressional
power to regulate commerce. The modern trend in Supreme Court
Commerce Clause analysis shows a much greater willingness to de-
fer to legislative determinations. Under present doctrines, the
Court will uphold commerce-based laws if there is any rational ba-
sis upon which Congress could have found a relation between the
regulation and interstate commerce.31 In 1890, when the statute
was passed, the reach of the commerce power was far narrower.2
Before the turn of the century, the Court had insisted upon a "di-
rect" relationship between the interstate activity being regulated
and interstate commerce.33
Thus, the Sherman Act was enacted against the background of
a Commerce Clause which reached only interstate commerce and
which left states broad power to regulate intrastate commerce.3 4
quoting Bostick Oil Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 702 F.2d 1207, 1219 (4th Cir. 1983): "'Noth-
ing in the nearly century old history of antitrust regulation is cited to us to suggest that
Congress has manifested a clear intent to displace state regulation of unfair trade
practices.'"
28 Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978), quoting Florida Lime & Avo-
cado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963) and Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52, 67 (1941).
29 See text at notes 41-57.
o The Act provides in relevant part that "[e]very contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations is declared to be illegal ...." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
31 John E. Nowak, Ronald D. Rotunda and J. Nelson Young, Handbook on Constitu-
tional Law 150 (West 1978).
32 Today, Congress has the power to override conflicting state laws. Cantor v. Detroit
Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 605 (1976) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
22 U.S. v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 17 (1895).
34 The Sherman Act and the regulatory power of Congress under the Commerce Clause
of the Constitution are both strictly confined to matters which directly and immediately
affect interstate or foreign commerce. See U.S. v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895); United
States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assoc., 166 U.S. 290 (1897); United States v. Joint Traffic
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The constitutional limitations upon the Sherman Act have now
disappeared, but this solicitude for state regulation of intrastate
commerce has reappeared in the form of the state action doctrine,
which limits the scope of the Sherman Act. 5
2. The Conflict/Interference Determination. The Supreme
Court repeatedly has held that states have the authority to regu-
late commerce "with respect to matters of local concern, on which
Congress has not spoken."38 Federal courts properly uphold state
regulations when, "upon a consideration of all the relevant facts
and circumstances," they determine that a regulation, "because of
its local character and the practical difficulties involved, may never
be adequately dealt with by Congress. ' 37 In the absence of a deter-
mination that federal law occupies the field, the preemption analy-
sis must focus on the relationship between the state statute dnd
the federal law. First, a court must find that the state statute oper-
ates in the same regulatory field as does the Sherman Act. The
court must then determine whether they conflict.3
The standard for state law preemption under the Sherman Act
is whether the state statute mandates or authorizes conduct that
will always violate Section 1 of the Act:
[T]he inquiry is whether there exists an irreconcilable
conflict between the federal and state regulatory
schemes. The existence of a hypothetical or potential
conflict is insufficient to warrant the pre-emption of the
state statute. A state regulatory scheme is not pre-
empted by the federal antitrust laws simply because in a
hypothetical situation a private party's compliance with
the statute might cause him to violate the antitrust laws.
A state statute is not pre-empted by the federal antitrust
laws simply because the state scheme might have an
anticompetitive effect. 9
Assoc., 171 U.S. 505 (1898); Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 594 (1898); Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
" See text at notes 41-57.
' Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 360 (1943).
'7 Id. at 362-63. The Court continued: "[b]ecause of its local character also there may
be wide scope for local regulation without substantially impairing the national interest in
the regulation of commerce.., which were the principle objects sought to be secured by the
Commerce Clause." Id. at 363.
8 Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 644 (1971).
'3 Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982), citing New Motor Vehicle
Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 111 (1978). See also Exxon Corp. v. Governor of
Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 133 (1978); and Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384
U.S. 35, 45-46 (1966).
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Thus, only if the state statute authorizes behavior that is per
se illegal under the Sherman Act, such as price fixing, will it be
deemed preempted on its face. If, on the other hand, the state reg-
ulation simply authorizes conduct which is subject to "rule of rea-
son" analysis-conduct which must be scrutinized on a case-by-
case basis-then it will be preempted only after a determination
that a specific application of the statute conflicts with the Sherman
Act.40
3. The State Action Exemption. Even when per se violations
of the Sherman Act are involved, it does not necessarily follow that
state regulation is preempted. State regulation is further protected
by the "state action" exemption, first enunciated in Parker v.
Brown.41 In Parker, California had established a raisin cartel. The
cartel restricted output and fixed prices at a level established by
California state officials.42 The Court held that the Sherman Act
did not preempt the California law. It found no suggestion in the
legislative history of the Sherman Act of a purpose "to restrain a
state or its officers from activities directed by its legislature," 43
finding instead that the Act was intended to suppress "business
combinations" of private individuals.44 The Court stated that the
Act applied to "persons" and not to states, and that a state, "in
adopting and enforcing the prorate program made no contract or
agreement and entered into no conspiracy in restraint of trade...
but as sovereign, imposed the restraint as an act of government
which the Sherman Act did not undertake to prohibit. '45
The Parker Court was concerned with the federalism implica-
tions of the case. It respected a state's authority to regulate com-
merce that was purely intrastate and recognized that absent an in-
terstate connection, regulatory authority was the domain of the
states.4
Although the federal antitrust law immunity recognized in
Parker does not extend to every transaction in which a state is
involved,47 it does apply where "'the challenged restraint [is] "one
10 Rice, 458 U.S. at 661. See also Parker, 317 U.S. at 361-63.
41 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
42 Id. at 347-48.
13 Id. at 350-51.
4 Id. at 351.
45 Id. at 352.
46 "In a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, the states are
sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority, an un-
expressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be
attributed to Congress." Id. at 351.
47 Id. at 351-52.
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clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy"
[and] the policy [is] "actively supervised" by the state itself'8
However, state participation will not always immunize what
would otherwise violate federal law.49 A state may not authorize
private antitrust violations by individuals, or declare them lawful.50
In addition, the state must intend to displace federal antitrust law.
Thus, a state official's mere policy-based approval of private action
cannot immunize that action from the operation of the Sherman
Act. For example, in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,51 although the
state public utility commission had approved a utility's longstand-
ing practice of replacing consumers' lightbulbs free of charge while
defraying the costs through increased electric rates, a majority of
the Court discerned no state intention to displace federal antitrust
law.52 Similarly, the Court distinguished the California plan in
Parker from state laws invalidated in Northern Securities Co. v.
United States,53 and Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. United
States. 4 In those cases the states had merely authorized private
illegal activity. The raisin cartel in Parker, however, instituted Cal-
ifornia's clearly expressed purpose to substitute its own regulation
for the open market and federal antitrust law. It did not simply
leave private parties unsupervised, but provided for continuous fi-
nal decision making by a state official.5 5
After Parker, most state action litigation has concerned the
liability of private parties regulated by public agencies. When a
state delegates certain powers to private parties, those parties may
be granted state action immunity. For example, the Court in Bates
v. State Bar5" found state action immunity for a rule against law-
yer advertising, where the state's highest court had actively super-
" 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 107 S. Ct. 720, 725 (1986), quoting California Retail Li-
quor Dealers Assoc. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980) (citation omitted).
"' Id. at 351. In Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 450 (1941), the
Court found that certain benefits conferred by a railroad terminal amounted to an unlawful
rebate by the railroad, which was participating in the terminal project with a governmental
agency. The case held that a private price-fixing conspiracy among rival producers is not
immune from the antitrust laws because one of the participants is state-owned.
'0 Id. at 351, citing Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 332, 344-47
(1904).
428 U.S. 579 (1976).
82 Id. at 584-85.
53 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
" 313 U.S. 450 (1941).
'1 Parker, 317 U.S. at 353-59.
56 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
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vised the implementation of the rule through judicial enforcement
proceedings.57
Despite the limitations discussed above, the state action ex-
emption is an example of federal deference to state regulation.
Given that even the Sherman Act-which certainly rises to the
level of federal "law"-has limited preemptive force, it is difficult
to imagine that an agreement between the Justice Department and
an alleged antitrust violator would, without more, be a sufficient
predicate to the creation of an exemption from state regulation.
B. Preemption By Fairness Hearing
The second possible source for elevation of antitrust consent
decrees to the level of federal law is Section 5(a) of the Tunney
Act, which mandates that a judge preface approval of such decrees
with a finding that the decree is in the public interest. It may be
argued that Congress, by requiring such approval, intended the
agreements so approved to have the preemptive force of federal
law. Nothing in the legislative history of the Tunney Act demon-
strates such intent. In fact, the purpose of the Tunney Act was
exactly the opposite. Congress was concerned that the Justice De-
partment was entering into decrees that verged on collusion with
antitrust violators. It would be ironic to interpret a statute that
was intended to curb prosecutorial discretion as enhancing the
power of Justice Department lawyers to grant alleged violators ex-
emptions from state regulation.
1. Tunney Act Legislative History: Reining in Prosecutorial
Discretion. A study of consent decree approval procedures prior to
the enactment of the Tunney Act and of the Tunney Act's legisla-
tive history indicate that its purpose was to rein in Justice Depart-
ment discretion. The Justice Department traditionally was given
considerable discretion in its enforcement of the antitrust laws.58
As consent decrees became the preferred means of antitrust en-
forcement, questions were raised regarding the scope of the Justice
Department's power.59 The Justice Department could bring and
57 Id. at 359-61.
58 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 4, 9 (1982). The United States attorneys, under the direction of the
Attorney General, are required to "institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain"
antitrust violations. Id.
19 Maxwell S. Isenbergh and Seymour J. Rubin, Antitrust Enforcement Through Con-
sent Decrees, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 386, 402-8 (1940); Andrea Berger Kalodner, Consent Decrees
as an Antitrust Enforcement Device, 23 Antitrust Bull. 277, 301-6 (1978); M. Goldberg, The
Consent Decree: Its Formulation and Use (Occasional Paper No. 8, Bureau of Bus. & Econ.
Research, Graduate School of Bus. Admin., Mich. St. Univ. 1962) at 404-05; William R.
Peterson, Consent Decrees: A Weapon of Anti-Trust Enforcement, 18 U. Kan. City L. Rev.
34, 49-50 (1950).
[1987:
PREEMPTION BY PROSECUTION
settle actions on terms arrived at by an essentially administrative
process. The only check on its actions was a review by the court
before it entered a decree,6 0 and few trial courts actually ques-
tioned the terms of the government's decrees. Thus, judicial review
was virtually no check at all. 1
After entry of the consent decree in the government's initial
action against AT&T in 1956, Congress investigated the Justice
Department's entire settlement program. The House Antitrust
Subcommittee conducted extensive hearings and issued a report
that was highly critical of the Justice Department's consent decree
program.2 The report concluded that judicial review of proposed
consent decrees was at best cursory,"3 even though a decree could
have an impact on an entire industry. 4 Nevertheless, the report
failed to enunciate a proper standard of review and confusion per-
sisted as to the degree of discretion granted the Justice Depart-
ment in settling antitrust actions versus the court's authority to
check that discretion in the name of the public interest.
The procedures mandated by the Tunney Act implement a
distinction made in United States v. Automobile Manufacturers
Association.5 In that case, the court bifurcated and distinguished
the complementary roles of the Justice Department and of courts
in antitrust cases. It drew a distinction between the administrative
discretion vested in the Antitrust Division and the discretion based
on legal considerations that provided a foundation for the court's
power to disapprove a proposed decree. The court stated that the
Antitrust Division could determine what actions it would bring
1o 1973 House Report at 6538 (cited in note 1).
OK Id.
02 Id. at 6537. The committee determined that the principal officials of the Justice De-
partment had abdicated their duty in accepting the 1956 AT&T decree. See Antitrust Con-
sent Decrees and the Television Broadcasting Industry, Hearings before the Antitrust Sub-
committee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1961)
("Antitrust Hearings") (citing to 1959 Antitrust Subcommittee report on Justice Depart-
ment practices regarding, inter alia, the 1956 AT&T decree). The committee labeled the
decree a" 'blot on the enforcement history of the antitrust laws,'" Antitrust Hearings at 3,
and concluded that the consent decree practice of the Antitrust Division had "'established
an orbit in the twilight zone between established rules of administrative law and judicial
procedures,'" 1973 House Report at 6537 (cited in note 1) (quoting also from 1959 Antitrust
Subcommittee report on Justice Department practices regarding, inter alia, the 1956 AT&T
decree).
OS Id. at 6538.
04 1959 House Report at 14 (cited in note 5).
05 307 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
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and that these decisions were not subject to judicial review." The
court, on the other hand, could disapprove a proposed consent de-
cree after considering the enforceability of the decree, the degree
to which the relief obtained was consistent with that asked for in
the complaint, the extent to which the decree jeopardized the
rights of parties not before the court, and whether the decree, as a
whole, was in the public interest.6 7 Justice Department discretion
was limited to the initiation of actions and their disposition, and
courts would reserve for themselves legality determinations.
Not all courts acted forcefully within the Automobile Manu-
facturers parameters. Three suits against the International Tele-
phone & Telegraph Company ("ITT") were brought by the Anti-
trust Division and were resolved by a single consent decree. 8
Although the strength of the government's case was questionable,69
the settlement was approved by the court" amidst much contro-
versy.7 1 These circumstances caused renewed congressional concern
for the viability of the Justice Department's consent decree pro-
gram. 2 In an effort to deal with these concerns, the Tunney Act
became law a few months after the approval of the ITT decree.73
Through the Tunney Act, Congress opened the consent decree
negotiation and settlement process to public scrutiny.7 4 Justice De-
partment discretion is effectively limited by provisions that call for
a judicial determination that the proposed decree is in "the public
interest. '75 Because the courts were perceived as having become
mere "rubber stamps" for the exercise of Justice Department dis-
cretion,7 6 the Tunney Act was enacted in an attempt to engender
66 Id. at 620.
67 Id. at 620-21.
68 United States v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. ("Hartford"), 1971
Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 73,666 (D. Conn. 1971); United States v. International Telephone &
Telegraph Corp. ("Canteen"), 1971 Trade Cas. (CCH) % 73,619 (N.D. 11. 1971); United
States v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. ("Grinnell"), 324 F. Supp. 19 (D.
Conn. 1970).
'" The Government lost the first two cases at trial (Grinnell and Canteen) and failed to
obtain a preliminary injunction in the third (Hartford).
70 See United States v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., 1974 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 1 74,872 (D. Conn. 1974) (rejecting attempt by amici to reopen decree).
71 Id.
72 See Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, Hearings on S. 782 and S. 1088 before
the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1973) (testimony of Sen. Tunney).
73 See United States v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., 1974 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 74,872 (D. Conn. 1974).
74 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(d) (1982).
75 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (1982). For text of provision, see note 3.
71 See 1973 House Report at 6538 (cited in note 1) ("One of the abuses sought to be
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confidence in the Justice Department's antitrust enforcement pro-
gram7 7 and to reiterate the enforcement policy of the Antitrust Di-
vision.78 The legislative history of the Tunney Act plainly demon-
strates that its purpose was to define and restrict prosecutorial
discretion. Its purpose was not to elevate a consent decree to the
level of federal law and thereby increase prosecutorial authority to
preempt state law.
C. The Shortcomings of Judge Greene's Reasoning
Although the structure of Judge Greene's argument in support
of his finding that the AT&T decree preempted state law was
somewhat unclear, he appears to have made it in three parts. First,
he implied a finding of conflict between state law and the Sherman
Act.79 In addition, he argued that since the provisions of the con-
sent decree were fully within the federal government's jurisdiction
over interstate commerce, and since telecommunications is an in-
dustry in need of national control and uniformity of regulation,
federal law in this area ought to preempt state law.80 This sounds
like an argument that federal law occupies the field; but, as dis-
cussed above, it is plain that Congress did not intend the Sherman
Act to occupy the field. 1 Thus it is a little unclear which preemp-
tion doctrine Judge Greene was relying on-the occupy-the-field
doctrine or the conflict/interference doctrine.
In the second part of his argument, Judge Greene showed that
the state action exemption did not apply to the facts of the AT&T
decree negotiations. He argued that because the states had not ad-
equately supervised telephone service, they failed the second part
of the Parker test. 2
Third-and this was the crux of his argument-Judge Greene
remedied by the bill has been called 'judicial rubber stamping' by district courts of propos-
als submitted by the Justice Department.").
77 Id. at 6536; 119 Cong. Rec. 3451 (1973) (statement of Sen. Tunney).
78 119 Cong. Rec. 24,599 (1973) (statement of Sen. Tunney). See also Consent Decree
Bills, Hearings on H.R. 9203, H.R. 9947 and S. 782 before the Subcommittee on Monopolies
and Commercial Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 43
(1973) (testimony of Sen. Tunney); 1973 House Report at 6542 (cited in note 1). The Su-
preme Court has consistently expressed this view. See, for example, United States v. Von's
Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 275 (1966); Sugar Institute Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553,
597 (1936); United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371, 388-89 (1923); United
States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179 (1911).
79 AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 154-55.
80 Id at 152.
81 See text at note 25.
82 AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 158.
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found that the decree was a judicial act, and therefore was federal
law.83 Judge Greene correctly stated that "preemption... may be
based on [the Constitution], on treaties, or on federal statutes such
as the Sherman Act."84 He properly cited Supreme Court authority
for the rule that "[s]tate-law prohibition[s] against compliance
with [a] District Court's decree cannot survive the command of the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution."8 His rea-
soning went awry, however, when he made the leap from the Con-
stitution, treaties and federal statutes to consent decrees, saying
"if this Court has authority under the Sherman Act to issue the
proposed decree, state regulatory statutes are unenforceable to the
extent they prevent compliance." In a footnote he added, "[t]he
fact that the decree would be issued pursuant to the parties' con-
sent is irrelevant to its status, for a consent decree has the same
effect as a decree issued after a finding of liability on the merits." 6
83 See text at notes 20-21.
84 AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 155.
85 Judge Greene cited Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fish-
ing Vessel Assoc. in support of this proposition. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 154-55. Although
the case does support that proposition, the case is analogous to AT&T and Judge Greene's
reasoning is coherent only if one substantively equates consent decrees such as the AT&T
decree with court orders entered subsequent to determinations that state law conflicts with
federal law or the Federal Constitution. Judge Greene leaves us with a mere tautology on
the preemption question because the cases he cites involved consent decrees entered subse-
quent to a finding of conflict between federal and state law and thus entered subsequent to
the preemption determination. See Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger
Fishing Vessel Assoc., 443 U.S 658 (1979) (determining that laws protecting the domestic
fishing industry were preempted because of conflict with federal treaties; decree promul-
gated by lower court was not the basis for the preemption determination, but was issued
subsequent to that determination).
Similarly, the school desegregation cases cited in AT&T involved decrees issued subse-
quent to findings that state law conflicted with the Constitution. The decrees themselves
enjoyed no substantive preemptive power. See North Carolina Board of Education v.
Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971); Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
8 AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 155 and n.102. Again, Judge Greene evaded a difficult in-
quiry by equating injunctions issued after findings of liability on the merits with judge-
signed decrees negotiated by the parties. It is rather startling that he cited one of the oldest
and least clear items in the consent decree catalogue in support of his argument-United
States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932). AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 155 n.102. Swift does
state that a consent decree is to be treated as a judicial act, id. at 115, but the words "judi-
cial act" are not equivalent to the phrase "a finding of liability on the merits." Swift does
not attempt to make such an equation. The passage from which he cites is concerned with
questions of consent decree modification. Justice Cardozo intended to establish only that
consent decrees, unlike contracts, are modifiable. See Charles Sullivan, Enforcement of Gov-
ernment Antitrust Decrees By Private Parties: Third Party Beneficiary Rights and Inter-
venor Status, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 822, 845-47 (1975) (discussing Justice Cardozo's opinion in
Swift).
Judge Greene's reading of Brown v. Neeb, 644 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1981), was similarly
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This assertion is at best partially correct. In Local Number 93
v. City of Cleveland, the Court found that "consent decrees 'have
attributes both of contracts and of judicial decrees,' a dual charac-
ter that has resulted in different treatment for different pur-
poses.... The question is not whether we can label a consent de-
cree as a 'contract' or a 'judgment,' for we can do both. 87 The
Court found that the relevant inquiry was whether, "given their
hybrid nature," consent decrees should be treated as "orders"
within the context of the law under consideration."" The Court
stated that where the language of a law does not specifically ad-
dress the characterization problem, the lower courts should con-
sider the legislative history. 9
As we have seen, the legislative history of neither the Sherman
Act nor the Tunney Act explicitly speaks to whether a consent de-
cree is to be considered federal "law" for preemption purposes.
The Tunney Act's legislative history does recognize that "once it
has been accepted by the court, [a consent decree] has the same
legal effect as a judgment in a fully litigated decree."9 Perhaps
Judge Greene reached his conclusion in AT&T because he stopped
reading the history here. It continues, "[a]fter entry, the legal ef-
fect of an antitrust consent decree on the rights of the parties, in-
cluding the rights of the Government, are adjudicatory rather than
contractual in nature."'" The history makes no statement regard-
ing the characterization of a consent decree with respect to non-
parties. One cannot presume that because a decree is a judgment
as between the parties it sufficiently manifests federal law for the
purpose of preempting state law where a state is not a party to the
decree.
To the extent that a decree is a contract, it is not limited by
the jurisdictional statute. Parties can agree to whatever they please
with respect to their obligations to each other. They cannot, how-
flawed. Brown merely discusses the scope of the Supremacy Clause. It does not support
Greene's contention that a consent decree as such constitutes a judicial act sufficient to
displace state law. Furthermore, as in the school desegregation cases cited in note 85, the
Brown decree was issued after the Court's finding that state law conflicted with the Consti-
tution. The city "agreed it had a constitutional duty to eradicate discrimination. The only
issues in question were the specific steps the city would take.... That was what the consent
decree in this case was all about," that is, an interpretation of the applicable federal law. Id.
at 562-62.
17 Local Number 93, 106 S. Ct. at 3074 (citations omitted).
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 1959 House Report at 2-3, cited in note 5.
' Id.
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ever, free each other from their obligations to other people or other
governmental entities, such as states. Neither can the parties to a
consent decree.2 An injunction, on the other hand, can supercede
state law.93 To the degree that a consent decree has the force to
preempt, it derives that force from its status as an injunction. But
an injunction, unlike a consent decree, may not require more than
would be required by federal law.94 Therefore, a decree should be
given preemptive effect only to the extent that it requires no more
than federal law. In the antitrust context, that means it must re-
quire no more than would be required by the Sherman Act. Any
term that cannot be reconciled with the Sherman Act should be
relegated to the status of a contractual term between the parties
and should not have any effect on the operation of state law.
Judge Greene failed to distinguish between a decree that was
written to reflect the requirements of, and to conform with, federal
law and a decree that in essence is an agreement between the par-
ties, that while lawful, is not a reflection of the particular law in
question. To the degree that a decree is found to embody the re-
quirements of the statute, those terms should be given preemptive
effect. Any consent decree term that exceeds what would be per-
mitted under the underlying statute should only be binding upon
the parties and should not be given preemptive effect.
IV. TAILORING THE CONSENT DECREE APPROVAL PROCEDURE TO
SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
If full adjudication of antitrust liability were required to link a
consent decree to the Sherman Act for the purposes of a preemp-
tion determination, effective antitrust enforcement by consent de-
cree would be impossible. One need only look at the resources
spent on the two most complex antitrust actions in recent years,
IBM95 and AT&T, to see that the Justice Department would be
hard-pressed to bring more than a single antitrust action at any
912 Local Number 93, 106 S. Ct. at 3080. Associate (now Chief Justice) Rehnquist, dis-
senting from a denial of certiorari in Ashley v. City of Jackson, similarly concluded "there is
no suggestion in the statutory scheme that a prior consent decree to which petitioners were
not parties either forecloses an individual's right to sue or divests federal courts of jurisdic-
tion." 464 U.S. 900, 903 (1983), quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47
(1974).
11 See, for example, North Carolina Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971);
Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
' See Local Number 93, 106 S. Ct. at 3077. See also note 25.
8' National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Cases and Procedures, Report to
the President and the Attorney General 42 (January 22, 1979).
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given time in the absence of the consent decree device. Such a low
level of antitrust enforcement would profoundly undercut the ef-
fectiveness of the Sherman Act.
We therefore need a framework whereby consent decree nego-
tiation and approval satisfies the need for national regulation and
yet does not authorize prosecutorial avoidance of state regulation. 6
These requirements can be satisfied if a court allows preemption
only after a determination that the terms of the consent decree
mirror the requirements of the Sherman Act. Only then should a
consent decree gain the force of law, sufficient to preempt conflict-
ing state law.
Consent decree negotiations usually occur shortly after the fil-
ing of a complaint by the Justice Department. The course of the
negotiations depends greatly upon the litigation process.97 A court
presented with a consent decree must address two questions: (1)
whether the consent decree fairly represents the purposes and re-
quirements of federal law; and (2) if the states have a colorable
claim, whether they have had an adequate opportunity to present
it. If the court cannot answer both questions affirmatively, it must
consider the consent decree for preemption purposes as a mere
contract or agreement between the parties which cannot properly
result in the preemption of state law.
A. Is the Consent Decree a Fair Representation of Federal Law?
Consent decree provisions do not necessarily reflect the man-
dates of federal law.98 Because a consent decree may go beyond the
legal authority of the Sherman Act,99 the court must find that the
decree is congruent with the requirements of the Sherman Act
before finding that the decree preempts state law. If a consent de-
cree is not a fair representation of the federal law under which the
parties negotiated the decree, the federal government cannot prop-
erly use the decree to circumvent state law.
11 See United States v. City of Jackson,.519 F.2d 1147, 1152 n.9 (5th Cir. 1975) ("Be-
cause of the consensual nature of the decree, voluntary compliance is rendered more likely,
and the government may have expeditious access to the court for appropriate sanctions if
compliance is not forthcoming. At the same time, the private parties involved also minimize
costly litigation and adverse publicity and avoid the collateral effects of adjudicated guilt.").
" See United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435, 441 (5th Cir. 1981) ("If the decree
also affects third parties, the court must be satisfied that the effect on them is neither un-
reasonable nor proscribed.").
" See text at note 96.
" Local Number 93, 106 S. Ct. at 3077. See also note 25.
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B. State Participation in the Conflict/Interference Determination
To the extent that the reviewing court cannot determine that
the terms of a consent decree are based directly on the underlying
federal law, this comment suggests that the consent decree must be
deprived of preemptive effect. In addition, where the states have a
colorable argument that there is no conflict between the decree
and state regulation, they ought to be given the opportunity to
participate in the conflict/interference determination.
Admittedly, AT&T did not involve state claims that were
likely to have prevailed in the conflict/interference determination.
Judge Greene properly disposed of the state's argument that this
case fell within the state action exemption. On the other hand, his
conflict/interference determination, which might have limited the
court's authority to order some of the remedial measures required
by the consent decree, was too casual:
[T]hose provisions in the proposed decree which are nec-
essary to vindicate the federal interest in the enforce-
ment of the antitrust laws will be approved notwith-
standing the fact that they may conflict with the state
laws or interests. However, in its overall consideration of
the public interest, the Court will also take into account
that a particular provision may be merely peripheral to
the federal interest but have a substantial adverse impact
on state laws.100
The process of weighing the relative importance of the federal and
state interests involved is one in which the states should have par-
ticipated. In general, an amicus brief is a sad substitute for direct
participation. State law should not be preempted by provisions
"peripheral to the federal interest" unless the Sherman Act clearly
so provides, and interested states should have greater, and more
direct, involvement.
CONCLUSION
Consent decrees have characteristics of both contracts and ju-
dicial acts. For the purposes of this comment, the most significant
difference between a consent decree and a judicial act is that the
former is not binding upon the rights of nonparties. For this rea-
son, a consent decree does not necessarily rise to the level of fed-
100 AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 160 (footnote omitted).
[1987:
431] PREEMPTION BY PROSECUTION 449
eral law. To the extent that a decree is not federal law, it cannot
preempt state law.
Because of limited Justice Department antitrust enforcement
resources, it is not appropriate to require that antitrust actions be
fully adjudicated before preemption can occur. If there is to be a
certain minimum amount of antitrust enforcement, we have to ac-
cept a certain amount of preemption by consent decree. To ensure
that an antitrust consent decree does not unwarrantedly ignore im-
portant state interests, however, such decrees must be coterminous
with the Sherman Act.
Michael D. Friedman

